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I. STATE CASES
A. Marker v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
A pro se litigant appealed the New Mexico Oil Conservation
Commission’s (“the Commission”) rulemaking involving amendments to the rules of financial assurance, 19.15.2, 19.15.8, and
19.15.25 NMAC.1 As a precondition to drilling or producing a well
under the New Mexico Oil and Gas Act (“the Act”), an operator of a
well must provide financial assurance to the Oil Conservation Division of the Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources Department (“the
Division”), “which runs ‘to the benefit of the state and [is] conditioned
that the well be plugged and abandoned’ upon cessation of use.”2 The
Division may order any well plugged and abandoned if an operator
fails to comply with the Act or the rules promulgated thereunder.3
The Act establishes two categories of financial assurance for active wells: (1) a blanket plugging financial assurance for temporarily
abandoned wells and (2) one well-plugging financial assurance in
amounts determined sufficient to reasonably pay the cost of plugging
the wells covered by the financial assurance, which is required for any
well that has been held in temporarily abandoned status for more than
two years.4 In 2018, the Legislature increased the cap on blanket assurance from $50,000 to $250,000, and the Commission proposed four
tiers of blanket plugging financial assurance based on a range of wells
owned by an operator.5
In 2018, the Division filed an application for rulemaking to
amend the rules governing financial assurance.6 After the hearing, the
petitioner appealed the financial assurance amendments to the New
Mexico Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the Commission’s amendment was not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the adoption of
the rule was arbitrary and capricious, (3) the Commission did not follow rulemaking procedure, and (4) the Commission violated his rights
to due process. The court affirmed the Commission’s amendments.7

1. Marker v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, No. A-1-CA-37860, 2021 WL
1530751, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2021).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *2.
7. Id.
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First, the court determined that the amendments were supported
by substantial evidence because the Commission reviewed data regarding costs incurred by the State of New Mexico, which included an
exhibit showing the costs of plugging wells over a four-year period.8
Second, the court determined that a four-tier approach was not
arbitrary because the tiers were based on an operator’s well volume.9
The Commission followed its statutory directive to promulgate rules
that effectuated the legislative cap increase.10
Third, the Commission did not violate rules of administrative procedure because it provided reasonable notice under the New Mexico
Rules Act and the Commission’s procedural rules for rulemaking
hearings.11 In addition, the lack of a public comment period prior to
the conclusion of the hearing did not violate rulemaking procedures.12
The court reasoned that the Commission requested further information
from the parties to better understand the competing proposals, and the
parties introduced the information at the hearing.13 The court also
noted that the New Mexico Rules Act does not require the Commission to provide a reason for limiting the issues on rehearing.14
Fourth, the court ruled that the petitioner’s due process rights
were not violated because he failed to identify a legitimate property
interest of which he was deprived.15 Lastly, the Court determined that
the statute did not apply retroactively, as the petitioner unsuccessfully
argued.16
B. Jalapeno Corp. v. New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
This is another case in which an appeal was brought against the
adoption of regulations following an administrative rulemaking.17 In
2018, the Division sought to comprehensively revise the rules governing horizontal wells under the Act.18 The Commission revised
19.15.15 and 19.15.16 NMAC (“the 2018 Rules”).19
8. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *6.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *8.
16. Id.
17. Jalapeno Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, No. A-1-CA-37449,
2020 WL 5743659, at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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The Jalapeno Corporation (“Jalapeno”) appealed the adoption of
the regulations, arguing that the 2018 Rules establishing guidelines for
well spacing, infill horizontal well, and transitional provisions were
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.20 The court affirmed.21
First, Jalapeno argued that the Commission’s failure to set acreage requirements for horizontal spacing units contravened its purported duty to establish spacing units based on the area that can be
efficiently and economically drained by one well and abdicated its
statutory obligation to fix well spacing.22 The court held that this argument was misplaced because it relied on a statute that addressed the
standard for proration units, not spacing units.23 It recognized that the
New Mexico Supreme Court had established a clear distinction between a proration unit and a spacing unit.24
Second, Jalapeno argued that the new definition of an “infill horizontal well” violates the correlative rights of non-consenting owners
bound by compulsory pooling orders and that the imposition of a
200% risk charge on multiple infill horizontal wells ignores the language of the statute authorizing those charges.25 The court determined
that the Commission considered the impacts on correlative rights and
reasoned that those rights are protected by the notice and hearing requirements under the Act.26
Jalapeno also challenged the new definition of an infill horizontal
well on the grounds that it includes proposed wells in addition to completed wells, which differs from the definition of other “infill wells”
which must be “completed and not plugged and abandoned.”27 The
court was unpersuaded and reasoned that the new definition was appropriate to reduce waste in the furtherance of the Commission’s legislative mandate.28 Jalapeno also argued that the new definition ran
afoul of section 70-2-17(C) by disregarding the permissive language
in the statute and expanding the risk charge from its application to a
specific, identified well that is the subject of a compulsory pooling
agreement to all infill side-by-side wells.29 Again, the court held that
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the notice and hearing requirements satisfy the Commission’s statutory obligation to determine risk on a case-by-case basis.30
Third, Jalapeno challenged the transitional provisions in the 2018
Rules, which provide as follows:
Any horizontal well drilled, commenced or permitted prior
to June 26, 2018 shall retain as its horizontal spacing unit the
standard or non-standard spacing unit or project area originally dedicated thereto. If that area is not a standard horizontal spacing unit as provided in Subsection B of 19.15.16.15
NMAC, that area is hereby approved as a non-standard horizontal spacing unit for the horizontal well so drilled, commenced or permitted.31
Jalapeno argued that the Commission did not explain the basis for the
rule and failed to provide notice to those impacted by this rule.32 The
court determined that the Commission’s rationale for adopting the rule
changes demonstrated a rational connection between the testimony regarding the transitional provisions and the Commission’s adoption of
the same.33
Finally, Jalapeno argued that due process required the Commission to provide notice to “several compulsory pooled owners” that the
rulemaking would address horizontal spacing units that had been previously pooled.34 The court pointed out that Jalapeno’s argument relied on a case that involved an adjudicatory proceeding and not a rulemaking.35
II. FEDERAL CASES
A. WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt
WildEarth Guardians (“Guardians”) challenged the Bureau of
Land Management’s (“BLM”) issuance of oil and gas leases covering
more than 68,232 acres of federal land for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), and the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”).36 BLM follows a “three-phase process” in issuing leases,
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
2020).

Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1201 (D.N.M.
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which involves a resource management plan, competitive bidding, and
an application for a permit to drill.37 The general thrust of Guardians’
argument was that BLM failed to adequately assess the cumulative
impacts of oil and gas development.38
Guardians made five discrete arguments under the APA standard
of review of agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)–(D): (a)
BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a hard look at the environmental impacts of oil and gas development; (b) BLM failed to provide a
sufficient rationale for not preparing an environmental impact statement (“EIS”); (c) BLM issued the leases unlawfully in the midst of a
resource management plan review; (d) BLM adopted new guidance
unlawfully by violating FLPMA’s public participation requirements
and NEPA’s implementing regulations; and (e) BLM’s adoption of
new guidance violated public notice and comment requirements.39
The court determined that BLM took a hard look at how the issuance of the leases would affect the regional environment, air quality,
and water quality.40 BLM was not required to use specific climate
change methodologies to assess the cumulative effects of oil and gas
development.41 In its interpretation of NEPA, the court found “nothing
in its text and nothing in its associated regulations specifically mandates that agencies perform a particular analysis or subscribe to particular methodology.”42
Also, contrary to Guardians’ argument, BLM was not required to
apply the social cost of carbon protocol to quantify the project’s contribution to costs associated with global climate change.43 The court
agreed with BLM that the “regulations preserve ample decision space
for federal agencies to use the metrics and methodologies best suited
to the issues at hand.”44 BLM appropriately considered the impact on
air quality in approving the new leases by way of its Air Resource
Technical Reports and discussion of the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards in detail in the environmental assessments (“EA” or
“EAs”).45 It also appropriately considered the impact on water quantity and quality by developing a foreseeable development report listing
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1213–14.
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current water usage and analyzing casing specifications, respectively.46
The court ruled that BLM reasonably determined that an EIS was
not needed to authorize the new leases.47 The court reasoned that the
EAs adequately and properly analyzed the direct and indirect effects
of oil and gas development in the region; that they contextualized the
leases on the local, national, and state level; and that BLM drew conclusions that the leases would not significantly impact the environment.48 Therefore, BLM was not required to prepare an EIS for each
lease.49
Next, the court concluded that Guardians had organizational
standing to challenge new agency guidance that detailed a new process
for competitive bidding.50 Guardians argued that it violated the
FLPMA and NEPA by removing public participation.51 In order to
challenge this guidance, however, the new guidance must constitute
final agency action.52 While the court found that the new guidance was
the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, it was not
a final agency action because it did not affect legal rights and obligations.53 The court acknowledged that BLM abided by the statutory requirements to include public participation, but it found that the new
guidance violated the FLPMA and NEPA regulations by altering previous language stating that “field offices will provide for public participation” to state that field offices “may” provide for public participation.54 The court reasoned, however, that vacation of the leases for
a minor alteration of BLM guidance would be a mark of judicial overreach.55 The court urged BLM to alter the language in its new guidance
to make it consistent with NEPA and FLPMA regulations by reverting
to prior regulatory language.56

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1224 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1225.
Id.
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B. Anderson Living Trust v. Energen Resources Corporation
This opinion was authored by the magistrate judge, who proposed
findings and recommended disposition to the district court, as explained below. This class-action suit involved allegations of systematic underpayment of royalties on oil and gas wells in the San Juan
Basin.57 After eight years of litigation, the parties filed a motion for
court approval of a settlement in the amount of $5,610,000.00 for the
class members.58
The court employed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) to
approve the final stage of settlement.59 The court must determine that
the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate in the final stage of
approval.60 The Tenth Circuit has developed a four-factor test to determine whether a proposed settlement meets Rule 23(e)(2)(A)–(F).61
The first factor considers whether the class representatives and
class counsel have adequately represented the class.62 The court found
that class counsel gained an adequate appreciation of the case’s merits
and obtained a substantial settlement, thus meeting the first factor.63
The second factor inquires whether the parties negotiated the proposal at arm’s length.64 The court reasoned that the second factor was
satisfied because experienced attorneys who were intimately familiar
with the legal and factual issues in an eight-year-long litigation obtained the result.65
The third factor queries whether the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.66 The court found that the settlement was allocated to the class based on the amount of monthly underpayments for the failure to pay royalty on fuel gas and when that
alleged underpayment occurred.67 The allocation plan also accounted
for all attorney fees, costs, and administrative expenses, and that it allocated those expenses pro rata.68
57. Anderson Living Tr. v. Energen Res. Corp., No. CV-13-909WJ/CG, 2021
WL 3076910, at *1 (D.N.M. July 21, 2021).
58. Id.
59. Id. at *2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id.
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The fourth and final factor considers whether the relief provided
for the class is adequate. This final factor includes four subfactors that
consider: (a) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (b) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class;
(c) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including the
timing of payment; and (d) any agreement required to be identified
under Rule 23(e)(3).69 The court found that the final factor was met
and that the four prongs under Rule 26(e)(2)(A)–(F) were ultimately
satisfied.70
The Tenth Circuit also requires the court to consider fairness under the four Rutter factors:
(1) whether the settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated; (2) whether serious legal and factual questions place the
litigation’s outcome in doubt; (3) whether the immediate recovery is more valuable than the mere possibility of a more
favorable outcome after further litigation; and (4) whether
the parties believe the settlement is fair and reasonable.71
For the provision on attorneys’ fees, the Tenth Circuit utilizes the “percentage of fund” method, does not use the lodestar method, and mandates courts to consider the 12 Johnson factors.72 The court recommended approval of the settlement under the Rutter factors and an
award of attorneys’ fees because each of the Johnson factors weighed
in favor of class counsel.73

69. Id. at * 4–5.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *7 (The Johnson factors include: “1. the time and labor involved; 2. the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3. the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; 4. the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5. the customary fee; 6. any prearranged fee—this is helpful
but not determinative; 7. time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
8. the amount involved and the results obtained; 9. the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; 10. the undesirability of the case; 11. the nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client; and 12. awards in similar cases.”).
73. Id. at *6, 9.

